Plaintiff’s business was the testing and balancing of heating and air conditioning units. Such testing and balancing insured that the unit was functioning within performance parameters. The testing requires the monitoring of air and water flow throughout a unit. Plaintiff did such monitoring and also was able to make adjustments to ensure that the system was functioning optimally. Defendant was a trade association with more than eighty members, each of whom provide such testing and balancing service on heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC) systems. The defendant provided certification for its members, so a purchaser of one of the member’s services could be assured that they would receive high-quality services.

Plaintiff was involved in a construction project in Utah. Other companies involved with the same project became dissatisfied with the plaintiff’s performance, and filed complaints with the defendant. The complaints led to an investigation of the plaintiff, and ultimately resulted in the defendant expelling the plaintiff from the trade association. Plaintiff then filed suit, seeking reinstatement with the defendant trade association, claiming that without such reinstatement of membership, their business would wither.

The first part of the Court’s discussion admonished the defendant, noting that Illinois antitrust laws apply only to for-profit corporations. The defendant trade association was a non-profit organization. The Court made a point of the issue since neither side had raised it in their pleadings. The Court did not rule on the issue.

Plaintiff first attempted to persuade the Court to grant a preliminary injunction. The Court noted that a preliminary injunction is an "extraordinary and drastic remedy," in which the party seeking one must show a likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm should the injunction be denied. The Court initially stated that plaintiff’s work on the injunction issue was inadequate, and that their analysis of the issue was only a page long. The Court also stated that the plaintiff chose to bring the suit under Illinois state antitrust laws, rather than Federal laws (the state laws, however, closely mirrored the language of the Federal statute).

The Court established that the standards for either per se or rule of reason antitrust tests are somewhat different in Illinois than under Federal law. These differences, however, did not affect the Court’s analysis. The Court determined that the rule of reason would apply to the plaintiff’s allegations, albeit for different reasons than what the plaintiff would have had the Court render.

Under the rule of reason, one of the main factors a Court examines is market power. The Court, adopting the defendant’s information, noted that while the defendant had 85 total members in its organization, there were over 500 independent testing firms like the plaintiff nationwide. The plaintiff also conceded that while there are certain advantages to membership in defendant’s association, it was not a necessity. The plaintiff failed to even define the market in which they were operating. In the Chicago area, of the 12 firms similar to the plaintiff, only one was a member of defendant’s trade organization.

The three main cases that the plaintiff cited as support were inapposite to the plaintiff’s theory of the case. The Court distinguished them; firstly noting that because the plaintiff was trying to persuade the Court to grant a preliminary injunction, their evidentiary burden was higher. Next, the plaintiff attempted to show that the other members of the defendant association had forced them out but the Court was not persuaded. Instead, they termed plaintiff’s arguments as conclusory, and that plaintiff failed to demonstrate how the conduct was so egregious that a preliminary injunction was warranted. Lastly, the Court held that plaintiff did not show how their expulsion from defendant trade association had an adverse impact on the balancing and testing industry.

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